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Abstract 
The effects of adaptation and mitigation on the impacts of sea level rise are studied. Without 
either, the impacts of sea level rise would be substantial, almost wiping out entire nations 
before 2100; the global effect is much smaller. Adaptation would reduce impacts by a factor 
10 to 100. As adaptation depends on socio-economic status, the rank order of most vulnerable 
countries is not the same as the rank order of most exposed countries. Adaptation would come 
at a minor cost compared to the damage avoided. Because the momentum of sea level rise is 
so large, mitigation can reduce impacts only to a limited extent. Stabilising carbon dioxide 
concentrations at 550 ppm would cut impacts up to 2100 by about 10%. However, if the costs 
of emission reduction are also factored in, then avoided impacts are less by up to 25% 
(average 10%). This is partly due to the reduced availability of resources for adaptation, and 
partly due to the increased sensitivity to wetland loss by adaptation.  
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Many people phrase climate policy’s basic trade-off as that between mitigation and adaptation 
(e.g., Barbier and Pearce, 1990; Nordhaus, 1991; Schelling, 1992; Parry et al., 1998). If we 
would mitigate more, climate change and its impacts are lower and we would have to adapt 
less. Optimal climate policy would balance the marginal costs of emission reduction and the 
marginal damage costs of climate change  (Nordhaus, 1992; Manne et al., 1995; Tol, 1999), 
itself a trade-off between adaptation and residual damage (Smith and Lenhart, 1996; 
Fankhauser et al., 1999; Mendelsohn, 2000). However, if we would mitigate more, we would 
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argument is often overlooked, although eloquently made by Schelling (1992, 1995), and 
demonstrated by Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) and Tol (2002c). This paper revisits this 
argument, focussing on sea level rise. 
Although my previous papers on this issue focussed on health, sea level rise may be the best 
place to demonstrate the double trade-off between adaptation and mitigation. Like health care, 
the standards of coastal protection rise with economic growth, perhaps rapidly so. However, 
the ocean reacts much more slowly to greenhouse gas emission reduction than does the 
atmosphere. This implies that slowing sea level rise in this century requires a larger and more 
expensive effort than slowing climate change. There may be few coastal benefits from 
mitigation, while the resource effect of mitigation may be larger and more immediate. 
To my knowledge, this subject has not been studied. Most studies of the impacts of sea level 
rise are classic impact studies, estimating the effects in one or more scenarios (Hoozemans et 
al., 1993; Baarse, 1995; Leatherman and Nicholls, 1995; Nicholls et al., 1995, 1999; Nicholls, 
2002, 2004). Only Nicholls and Lowe (forthcoming) estimate the difference between a 
business-as-usual and an emission reduction scenario. However, Nicholls and Lowe 
(forthcoming) implausibly assume that deep emission cuts are cost-less. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model used, version 2.8n of FUND, is 
presented. Section 3 discusses the scenarios. Section 4 shows estimates of the impacts of sea 
level rise. Section 5 analyses how impacts change with emission reduction. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The model 
The model used is version 2.8n of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.8n is different in many ways from previous versions. 
However, in this paper, only coastal impacts are used, and these are as described in Tol 
(2002a,b). The essentials are given below. Version 2.8n differs from version 2.8 (Link and 
Tol, 2004) in that version 2.8n runs at its maximum spatial resolution, that is, 207 countries; 
version 2.8 has only 16 regions. 
Essentially, FUND2.8n consists of a set of exogenous scenarios based on which impacts are 
calculated. The model runs from 1995 to 2100 in time steps of five years. The scenarios are 
the SRES scenarios, as implemented by the IMAGE2 model (IMAGE Team, 2002). The 
scenarios concern the rate of population growth and economic growth, carbon dioxide 
concentrations, global mean temperature and sea level rise.  
The climate impact module is based on Tol (2002a,b). The following impact categories of 
climate change are considered: agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and 
respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, 
diarrhea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. In this paper, 
only sea level rise impacts are used. The impacts of sea level rise include dryland loss, 
wetland loss, protection costs, and forced migration. 
These impacts interact with one another. For example, if a piece of dryland is fully protected, 
no dryland will be lost, but the costs of protection will be high, and the adjacent wetland may 
be inundated. The total impact of sea level rise depends on the adaptive policy chosen. 
Consequently, the estimated damage depends strongly on the projected policy. For instance, 
IPCC CZMS (1991) uses the ad hoc rule that all dryland with a population density above 10 
people per square meter will be protected while Fankhauser (1994, 1995) and Yohe et al. 
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difference can be substantial. 
The coast length of all countries in the world was taken from the Global Vulnerability 
Assessment (Hoozemans et al., 1993), an update of work earlier done for the IPCC (IPCC 
CZMS, 1990). Other sources, such as the proceedings of the 1993 World Coast Conference 
(Bijlsma et al., 1994), Nicholls and Leatherman (1995a,b) and Fankhauser (1995), use 
(occasionally widely) different estimates of the length of the coast of particular countries. 
However, the length of a coast depends on the measurement procedure. The GVA is based on 
an internally consistent, globally comprehensive data-set. Therefore, the GVA is used here. 
Wetland losses for a 1 metre sea level rise were taken from the GVA and, where available, 
replaced with results from country studies as reported by Bijlsma et al. (1996) plus Nicholls 
and Leatherman (1995a,b). The reasons are: (i) the GVA is a desk study which occasionally 
shows signs of the great haste of its preparation; (ii) the country studies use local data; and 
(iii) land lost because of sea level rise is more obviously estimated than coast length. Bijlsma 
et al. (1996), however, only report wetland losses in the absence of coastal protection. The 
GVA reports wetland losses both with and without coastal protection; the country-specific 
ratio between the two was used to derive wetland losses with protection according to Bijlsma 
et al. (1996). 
Dryland losses are not reported in the GVA, but they are by Bijlsma et al. (1996). The GVA 
reports people-at-risk, which is the number of people living in the one-in-1000-year flood 
plain, weighted by the chance of inundation. Combining this with GVA's coastal population 
densities, area-at-risk results. The exponential of the geometric mean of the ratio between 
area-at-risk and land loss for the 18 countries in Bijlsma et al. (1996) was used as a correction 
factor to derive land loss for all other countries. 
The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometer of dryland was on average $4 million in 
OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be proportional 
to GDP per square kilometer. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square kilometer on 
average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have 
logistic relation to per capita income. 
Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland 
lost due to the construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. The level of protection is 
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L is the fraction of the coastline to be protected. PC is the net present value of the protection if 
the whole coast is protected. The GVA reports average costs per year over the next century. 
PC is calculated assuming annual costs to be constant. This is based on the following. Firstly, 
the coastal protection decision makers anticipate a linear sea level rise. Secondly, coastal 
protection entails large infrastructural works which last for decades. Thirdly, the considered 
costs are direct investments only, and technologies for coastal protection are mature. 
Throughout the analysis, a pure rate of time preference, ρ, of 1% per year is used. The actual 
discount rate lies thus 1% above the growth rate of the economy, g. The net present costs of 





























where PCa is the average annual costs of protection. 
  3WL is the net present value of the wetlands lost due to full coastal protection. Land values are 
assumed constant, reflecting how much current decision makers care about the non-marketed 
services and goods that get lost. The amount of wetland lost is assumed to increase linearly 





























where WL0 denotes the value of wetland loss in the first year. 
DL denotes the net present value of the dryland lost if no protection takes place. Land values 
are assumed to rise at the same pace as the economy grows. The amount of dryland lost is 




























where DL0 is the value of dryland loss in the first year. 
Another effect associated with dryland loss is that the people who used to live on the washed 
land are forced to move elsewhere. Forced migration may well be one of the most pronounced 
impacts of sea level rise (Myers and Kent, 1995), considering the fact that people tend to 
cluster in deltas and near shores (Vellinga and Leatherman, 1989). Emigration estimates 
follow from multiplying the projected loss of drylands with the country-average population 
density. The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita income (Tol, 1995, 1996). 
This implies that migration is linear in land lost and population growth, while migration costs 
are linear in land loss, population growth and per capita income growth. The same is true for 
(the value of) dryland lost. Hence, the dynamics of migration are similar to the dynamics of 
other, less controversial impacts. Migration results are therefore not shown. 
 
3. Scenarios 
The population scenario used is IPCC SRES A1/B1 scenario (Nakicenovic et al., 2001) as 
implemented in the IMAGE 2.2 model (IMAGE Team, 2002). The IMAGE model has 
population projections for 17 world regions. Population growth was assumed to be the same 
for all countries within a region. The A1/B1 scenario has moderate population growth. The 
world population peak at 8.7 billion people in 2055, and falls to 7.0 billion in 2100. 
The scenario for per capita income is the IPCC SRES A1B scenario, again as implemented in 
IMAGE. Per capita income growth within a region is assumed to be uniform. Economic 
growth is fairly rapid. Japan is the slowest grower, seeing its per capita income quadruple 
over the century, an average annual growth of 1.3%. The fastest grower is South Asia, seeing 
its per capita income increase by a factor of 180, an average annual growth of 5.1%. This is 
not the place to criticise SRES. 
Using the population and economic scenarios, as well as the corresponding scenarios on 
technological progress, the full FUND model, version 2.8,
1 was used to generate scenarios of 
climate change and sea level rise.  CO2 concentrations rise to 870 ppm by 2100, the global 
mean temperature to 3.5ºC above pre-industrial, and the sea rises by 66 cm. 
As a stabilisation scenario, CO2 concentrations are kept below 550 ppm. The stabilisation 
scenario was implemented in the full FUND 2.8 model. Atmospheric stabilisation slows sea 
                                                 
1 That is, the version with 16 regions rather than 207 countries. 
  4level rise, but only by about 10 cm in 2100. Later gains are much larger. Atmospheric 
stabilisation requires greenhouse gas emission reduction, which reduces economic growth. 
For this scenario, per capita income is about 3% lower in 2100 than in the baseline scenario. 
 
4. Costs and benefits of adaptation 
Figure 1 shows dryland loss, as a fraction of the 2000 area, per country in 2000, 2025, 2050, 
2075, and 2100. Coasts are assumed to be unprotected. Exposure differs by 7 orders of 
magnitude. The most exposed countries are the Maldives (77% land loss in 2100), Micronesia 
(21%), Macau (18%), Vietnam (15%) and Bangladesh (10%). Exposure increases over time. 
In the case of the Maldives, the projected land loss is 13% in 2025, 29% in 2050, 51% in 2075 
and 77% in 2100. 
Figure 1 also shows the costs of dryland loss, as a percentage of GDP. As dryland value is 
assumed to be linear in income density, the rank order is the same. The most exposed 
countries are the Maldives (122% of GDP in 2100), Micronesia (12%), Macau (10%), 
Vietnam (8%) and Bangladesh (5%).The economic exposure grows less fast than the physical 
exposure, as the rate of the sea level rise is faster than the rate of economic growth. In the case 
of the Maldives, the costs of land loss are 19% of GDP in 2025, 32% in 2050, 55% in 2075, 
and 122% in 2100. 
Figure 2 shows wetland loss, as a fraction of the 2000 area, per country in 2000, 2025, 2050, 
2075, and 2100. Coasts are assumed to be unprotected. Exposure differs by 3 orders of 
magnitude. The most exposed countries are the Benin (62% wetland loss in 2100), Congo 
(Kinshasa) (55%), Cameroon (52%), Bangladesh (46%) and Pakistan (46%). Exposure 
increases over time, but at a decelerating rate as wetlands disappear entirely. In the case of 
Benin, the project wetland loss is 9% in 2025, 22% in 2050, 40% in 2075 and 62% in 2100. 
Figure 2 also shows the costs of wetland loss, as a percentage of GDP.  Exposure differs by 6 
orders of magnitude. As wetland value is non-linear, the rank order is different than for 
wetland area. The most exposed countries are the Bahamas (4.8% of GDP in 2100), Papua 
New Guinea (3.0%), Belize (1.4%), Malaysia (0.5%) and Senegal (0.4%).The economic 
exposure grows faster than the physical exposure, as people grow richer while wetlands get 
scarcer, both of which drive up the value of wetlands. For the Bahamas, the value of wetland 
loss amounts to 1.3% of GDP in 2025, 2.3% in 2050, 3.3% in 2075 and 4.8% in 2100. 
Figure 3 shows the optimal protection level for those countries which would lose land 
otherwise; for the other countries, the optimal protection level is zero. Almost all countries 
have full protection as of 2025. There are a few rank reversals through time, as some 
countries grow faster than others. The least protected countries in 2100 are Kiribati (74% of 
the vulnerable coast line protected), New Caledonia (94%), Fiji (96%), New Zealand (96%) 
and Sweden (96%). Figure 3 also shows the costs of protection, expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. Relative protection costs differ seven orders of magnitude. The countries which pay 
most for coastal protection are Micronesia (0.36% of GDP in 2100), Palau (0.30%), Tuvalu 
(0.07%), Kiribati (0.06%) and the Marshall Island (0.04%). Costs fall over time. In the case of 
Micronesia, protection costs are 0.63% in 2025, 0.54% in 2050, 0.44% in 2075 and 0.36% in 
2100. A cursory comparison of protection costs and the costs of dryland loss indicates why 
protection levels are so high. 
Figure 1 shows dryland losses with optimal protection. At the maximum end, land loss falls 
by two orders of magnitude; at the minimum end, by one order of magnitude. Whereas 
without protection (exposure), the rank order of countries is preserved over time, this is not 
the case with protection (vulnerability). The relative vulnerabilities of countries change as 
some grow faster than do others. In 2100, the most vulnerable countries are Micronesia (7.6% 
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physical vulnerability rises. For Micronesia, land losses are 3.1% of land area in 2025, 5.0% 
in 2050, 6.4% in 2075 and 7.6% in 2100. This is because land loss in irreversible and 
cumulative. 
Figure 1 also show the costs of dryland loss, as a percentage of GDP, with optimal coastal 
protection. At the maximum end, economic loss falls by more than two orders of magnitude; 
at the minimum end, by three orders of magnitude. As with physical vulnerability, the rank 
order of economic vulnerability is not preserved over time; this is more pronounced for 
physical than for economic vulnerability, though. In 2100, the most vulnerable countries are 
Micronesia (0.15% of GDP), Palau (0.12%), Kiribati (0.03%), Tuvalu (0.03%), and the 
Marshall Islands (0.02%). Over time, economic vulnerability falls, in contrast to physical 
vulnerability. In the case of Micronesia, the value of land losses is 0.30% of GDP in 2025, 
0.23% in 2050, 0.18% in 2075 and 0.15% in 2100. This is because protection levels increase. 
Figure 2 shows wetland losses with optimal protection. Wetland losses increase in some 
twenty countries. Wetlands suffer most from coastal protection in Liberia (21% land loss due 
to coastal protection in 2100; Liberia is seventh on the list of most vulnerable countries), 
Puerto Rico (18%), St Lucia (18%), Jamaica (18%) and South Africa (11%). All other 
countries suffer losses of less than 5% of wetland area. Whereas without protection 
(exposure), the rank order of countries is preserved over time, this is not the case with 
protection (vulnerability). The relative vulnerabilities of countries change as some have 
higher protection than do others and some wetlands are more susceptible to coastal squeeze 
than are others. However, the top 5 most vulnerable countries remains the same, and the time 
profile does not change substantially. 
Figure 2 also show the costs of wetland loss, as a percentage of GDP. People suffer the 
greatest welfare losses due to wetland losses because of coastal protection in Denmark (0.11% 
of GDP; Denmark is sixth on the list of most vulnerable countries), Antigua and Barbuda 
(0.04%), Liberia (0.04%), Ireland (0.04%) and Honduras (0.03%). As with physical 
vulnerability, the rank order of economic vulnerability is not preserved over time; this is more 
pronounced for economic vulnerability. The top 5 most vulnerable countries does not change, 
however, and the time profile is hardly different. 
 
4. Costs and benefits of mitigation 
Figure 4 shows the difference in protection levels because of emission reduction (sea level 
rise plus slower economic growth) for the world and for Kiribati, where this effect is largest. 
The effect of lower sea level rise alone is too small to depict. The effect is less than 4% of the 
coastline for Kiribati, and much smaller still for the world. Figure 4 also shows the difference 
in protection costs because of lower sea level rise for the world and for Micronesia, where this 
effect is largest. The effect of lower sea level rise coincides with the effect of emission 
reduction, as the effect of slower economic growth alone is too small to depict. The effect are 
cost savings of less than 0.16% GDP in Micronesia, and much less than that for the world. 
The differences are zero in 2000, by construction. The differences are maximum in 2025. For 
protection levels, this is because more and more countries choose close to full protection as 
time progresses, and stick to that policy regardless of small deviations in sea level or 
development. For protection costs, the same pattern is observed because protection costs grow 
not as fast as does the economy. 
Figure 5 displays dryland losses and its costs in 2100 according to the business as usual 
scenario and the emission reduction scenario; Figure 5 also shows the difference. A stringent 
emission reduction scenario as considered here cuts land loss and its costs by about 10%. This 
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of area and value, are Micronesia, Palau, Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. 
Unsurprisingly, this is also the list of countries most vulnerable to sea level rise. 
Figure 6 shows the difference in dryland loss and its costs because of emission reduction and 
because of lower sea level rise alone for the world and for Japan, where the difference due to 
adding the costs of emission reduction is largest (in relative terms). As seen in Figure 5, 
emission reduction reduces the impacts on drylands. However, lower sea level rise has a 
positive effect, while the costs of emission reduction has a negative effect. For the world as a 
whole, emission reduction costs take away 11% of the benefits of lower sea level rise in 2100; 
in Japan, this number is 23%. In general, emission reduction costs take away a larger 
(smaller) share of the benefits of reduced sea level rise in richer (poorer) countries because the 
loss of wetlands due to coastal protection is of greater (smaller) concern, making the optimal 
protection level more (less) sensitive to economic growth. 
Figure 7 displays wetland losses and its costs in 2100 according to the business as usual 
scenario and the emission reduction scenario; Figure 7 also shows the difference. A stringent 
emission reduction scenario as considered here cuts wetland loss and its costs by about 10%, 
the same order of magnitude as dryland loss avoided. This is because the impacts are 
essentially linear in sea level rise. The greatest beneficiaries in terms of wetland area are 
Benin, Congo (Kinshasa), Cameroon, Bangladesh and Pakistan; in terms of wetland value, the 
greatest beneficiaries are the Bahamas, Papua New Guinea, Belize, Malaysia and Senegal.  
Again, this coincides with the list of countries most vulnerable to sea level rise. 
Figure 8 shows the difference in wetland loss and its costs because of emission reduction and 
because of lower sea level rise alone for the world and for Australia (wetland area) and Papua 
New Guinea (wetland value), where the difference due to adding the costs of emission 
reduction is largest (in relative terms). As seen in Figure 7, emission reduction reduces the 
impacts on wetlands. However, lower sea level rise has a positive effect, while the costs of 
emission reduction has a negative effect. For the world as a whole, the effect of emission 
reduction costs on wetland area saved is negligible; in Australia, the number is 0.2% in 2100. 
For the world, the effect of emission reduction costs on wetland value saved is 5%; in Papua 
New Guinea, this is 17% in 2100. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Four scenarios are systematically compared. The first scenario is a scenario with economic 
and population growth, climate change and sea level rise, but no adaptation. The second 
scenario has adaptation. The benefits of adaptation, in this case dike building, are substantial 
in terms of land loss prevented and economic damage avoided. The costs of adaptation are 
smaller than the benefits. Adaptation costs include the costs of dike building, but also the 
wetlands squeezed between the rising sea and dikes. Because adaptation depends on such 
things as population density and per capita income, vulnerability (with adaptation) does not 
correspond one-to-one with exposure (without adaptation). 
In the third scenario, the level of the sea rises more slowly, corresponding to a stabilisation of 
CO2 concentrations at 550 ppm. Although the emission reductions required for this are 
substantial, the momentum in climate change and sea level rise is too large to avoid more than 
10% of the impacts on wetlands and drylands. Protection levels are hardly affected, but dikes 
need to be less high, which implies savings on costs. 
In the fourth scenario, the costs of emission reduction are also included. Because economic 
growth is less, countries are less able and less willing to defend themselves against the rising 
sea. The costs of emission reduction take away an average of 10% (a maximum of 25%) of 
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for wetlands. These numbers suggest that one cannot estimate the benefits of emission 
reduction (as in the third scenario) without also considering the costs of emission reduction. 
This analysis was done with a single model, a single set of parameters, and a single baseline 
scenario. An analysis of the sensitivities and uncertainties is obviously needed but beyond the 
scope of this paper.  The qualitative insight – that emission reduction affects the impacts of 
sea level rise through the climate as well as through the economy – is independent of 
parameters, scenarios, and models. The estimated quantity would differ. 
That basic insight shows that adaptation and mitigation are not just alternative policy options 
for climate change. If mitigation is higher, less adaptation is needed, but there is also less 
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Figure 1. Loss of dryland (fraction of total area in 2000; top panels) and its value (percent of 
GDP; bottom panels) without protection (left panels) and with (right panels). Countries are 







































































































Figure 2. Loss of wetland (fraction of total area in 2000; top panels) and its value (percent of 
GDP; bottom panels) without protection (left panels) and with (right panels). Countries are 






































































Figure 3. Protection level (fraction of coast protected; left panel) and the costs of protection  













































































































Figure 4. The effects of lower sea level rise and emission reduction costs on coastal protection 
for the world and for Kiribati (left panel) and on the costs of coastal protection for the world 






































































Figure 5. The dryland loss (fraction of 2000 land area; left panel) and its costs (percent GDP; 
right panel) in 2100 according to the business as usual scenario and the emission reduction 
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Figure 6. The effects of lower sea level rise alone and of emission reduction on dryland loss 



































































Figure 7. Wetland loss (fraction of 2000 wetland area; left panel) and its costs (percent GDP; 
right panel) in 2100 according to the business as usual scenario and the emission reduction 
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World, less sea level rise
Papua New Guinea, emission reduction
Papua New Guinea, less sea level rise
 
Figure 8. The effects of lower sea level rise alone and of emission reduction on wetland loss 
(left panel) and its costs (right panel) for the world (left axis) and for Australia (wetland area) 
and Papua New Guinea (wetland costs; right axis). 
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